Breaking Away: The Endogenous Formation of Local Governments
Why are new local governments created, and who gains and loses?
Abstract
Why do communities break away from counties to form their own municipalities? Tiebout sorting takes local governments as given, but municipal incorporation in the United States allows communities directly governed by counties to form municipalities and gain control over zoning, municipal public goods, and taxes. Using 353 U.S. incorporations from 1970 to 2020, I show that larger communities and those Whiter and richer than their counties are more likely to incorporate. I develop and estimate a model of policy choice and jurisdiction formation that distinguishes two motives: control over local policies and retention of the local tax base. The average incumbent resident of a new municipality gains welfare equivalent to 0.22% of income, comparable to a 9% increase in municipal public goods without higher taxes. About half comes from better-matched zoning, net of higher housing costs, and the rest from keeping the local tax base. Better-matched public goods contribute almost nothing because residents differ far more in their preferences over zoning than over municipal public goods. The tax-base gains come largely at the expense of residents of the remaining unincorporated county, who lose 0.013% of income on average. Giving them veto power would halve expected incorporations, mostly by blocking communities richer than their counties. Allowing new municipalities to compensate these residents would restore most of the vetoed incorporations, because compensation offsets municipalities’ fiscal gains while preserving the benefits of local policy control.